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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an interlocutory appeal of an order of the Second Judicial District Court in
a civil case. This Court's jurisdiction is based upon Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-22(3)0).

RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES
Defendant cites as the relevant statute Utah Code Annotated Section 63-30d-502.
That citation is not correct. Mrs. Carter died in 2003. Section 63-30d-502 did not take
effect until July 1, 2004. Therefore, the relevant statute is Section 63-30-17 although in
this case the language is the same.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 63-30-17:
Actions against the state may be brought in the county in which the
claim arose or in Salt Lake County. Actions against a county may be brought
in the county in which the claim arose, or in the defendant county, or, upon
leave granted by a district court judge of the defendant county, in any county
contiguous to the defendant county. Leave may be granted ex parte. Actions
against all other political subdivisions including cities and towns, shall be
brought in the county in which the political subdivision is located or in the
county in which the claim arose.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 78-13-7:
In all other cases the action must be tried in the county in which the
cause of action arises, or in the county in which any defendant resides at the
commencement of the action; provided, that if any such defendant is a
corporation, any county in which such corporation has its principal office or
place of business shall be deemed the county in which such corporation resides
within the meaning of this section. If none of the defendants resides in this
state, such action may be commenced and tried in any county which the
plaintiff may designate in his complaint; and if the defendant is about to depart
from the state, such action may be tried in any county where any of the parties
1

resides or service is had, subject, however, to the power of the court to change
the place of trial as provided by law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

In November, 2002, Mrs. Carter underwent hip revision surgery at the

University of Utah Medical Center. Thereafter, she was released to the Manorcare
Nursing Home in Ogden where she had a fall in late December, 2002. That fall damaged
her newly revised hip and began a series of treatments and operations at the University of
Utah Medical Center.
2.

A lawsuit has been filed against Manorcare alleging its negligence relating

to the fall. That claim has now been consolidated with plaintiffs claims against the
University of Utah Medical Center and the Crestwood Care Center.
3.

Between January 30, 2003 and February 15, 2003 when Mrs. Carter was

diagnosed with a MRSA (Methicillin Resistant Staph Aureus) staph infection, which
contributed to or lead to her death, Mrs. Carter received medical treatment at both the
University of Utah Medical Center and the Crestwood Care Center.
4.

A MRSA staph infection is primarily regarded as a nosocomial infection,

meaning in this instance a staph infection acquired in a hospital or nursing care setting
due to improper sterile techniques or practices.
5.

The incubation period for the MRSA infection, diagnosed in Mrs. Carter on

February 15, 2003, is consistent with her medical treatment stays at the University of
Utah Medical Center and/or the Crestwood Care Center.
2

6.

During the critical periods of time for incubation of the MRS A staph

infection, Mrs. Carter was in the University of Utah Medical Center or the Crestwood
Care Center. So, to a high degree of probability, she contracted her infection in one
facility or the other.
7.

Defendants Crestwood Care Center and Manorcare Care Center are both

located in Ogden, Utah. Any claims against each arose in Weber County, these
defendants have their principal places of business in Weber County, and venue is,
therefore, proper against both in Weber County.
8.

Mrs. Carter's fall, her medical treatment, operations, hospital and nursing

home care are interrelated events leading to her death in August, 2003. One trial is the
proper and efficient way to resolve this case.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Section 63-30-17, Utah Code Annotated simply does not speak to the issue of
venue when there are multiple defendants including the state causing or contributing to an
injury, death or other claim. The only statutory venue provision which specifically
addresses multiple defendant situations is Section 78-13-7 which places proper venue in
the county in which any defendant resides.
A review of the Utah Legislature's enactment and passage of Senate Bill 4, 1965
which created the governmental immunity act Section 63-30-1 et seq., Utah Code
Annotated, and contained what became Section 63-30-17 reveals nothing to indicate that
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the Legislature ever discussed venue in multi-defendant cases or that it intended Section
63-30-17 to supplant Section 78-13-7 in multi-defendant cases.
Public policy reasons do not support the notion that it is an extraordinary or
unusual burden for the University or other agency of state government to have to defend
multi-defendant cases in a county other than Salt Lake County.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
NOTHING IN THE ENACTMENT OF SENATE BILL 4,
1965 WHICH BECAME THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY
ACT LEADS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE LEGISLATURE
INTENDED TO LIMIT VENUE AGAINST THE STATE IN MULTIDEFENDANT SITUATIONS TO SALT LAKE COUNTY.
The Utah Government Immunity Act was enacted by the Legislature in 1965 to
become effective on July 15 1966. What became the Governmental Immunity Act
originated as Senate Bill 4 in 1965. The Senate Judiciary Committee notes no longer
exist but the conceptual basis for the legislation is set forth in the Senate Judiciary
Committee report dated January 14, 1965.
January 14, 1965
Mr. President:
Your Committee on the Judiciary to which was
referred S.B. No. 4, by Messrs. Welch and M. Jenkins, has
carefully considered said bill and reports the same act
favorably for the following reasons:
1.
It is the opinion of the Judiciary Committee that
the ancient doctrine of governmental immunity based on the
concept that the king can do no wrong should be basically
modified in modern society.
2.
Said act serves to allow the citizens of the State
of Utah equitable remedy in the Courts where they have been
4

damaged.
3.
Said act empowers government units to
protect themselves by the purchase of insurance.
4.
The passage of said act is in the best
interests of the citizenship of this State.
Respectfully
Oscar W. McConkie, Jr.
Chairman
Senate Journal, Utah 1965, p. 101
Legislators wanted citizens of this state to have some method of redress against the state
for injury claims and authorized the state to protect itself by purchasing insurance.
In none of the audio tape discussions about the bill is there any indication that the
Legislature intended to supplant Section 78-13-7 by making Salt Lake County the
exclusive venue in multi-defendant cases where one defendant is the state or an arm of
the state and other necessary defendants reside or acted outside Salt Lake County.
Further, nothing in the governmental immunity act itself indicates any regard for or
consideration about the multi-defendant situation.
This was precisely the situation that the Michigan Court of Appeals faced in the
case of Hoffman v. Bos, 224 N.W.2d 107 (Mich App.). Plaintiff had been injured in a
motorcycle accident. She brought suit against Bos the operator of the motorcycle, Honda
Motor Co. and the road commission of Barry County, Michigan in the Kent County
Circuit Court. Michigan had a general venue statute which addressed multiple defendant
situations and a statute which said substantively that you must sue a governmental unit in
the county where it exercises its governmental authority but which did not address a
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multi-defendant situation. Barry County therefore moved for a change of venue out of
Kent County and to Barry County arguing it could only be sued in the Barry County
Circuit Court.
In that situation, the Michigan Court of Appeals recognized that standard rules of
statutory construction are not persuasive in resolving the conflict because such rules of
construction lead to opposite results - i.e. one can argue persuasively that by not
mentioning or referring to multi-defendant cases in the county government venue statute
the legislature intended to keep intact the existing statute which does refer to multidefendant venue or that by enacting a county government venue statute that the legislature
intended to mandate only one venue.
The Court also recognized that the same public policy arguments raised by the
University of Utah Medical Center - - the added cost and inconvenience of requiring
governmental units to defend themselves in distant counties are offset by the strong
public policy reasons justifying trying all grievances in a single suit especially in this
modern day when dockets are crowded and with "the development of modern
communication and ease of transportation" the significance of the added cost and
inconvenience argument has diminished in substance.
Ultimately, the Michigan Court of Appeals came down on the practical side of
recognizing that the minority of cases involving governmental entities are multidefendant cases. Therefore, in those situations venue would lie in any appropriate county
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where a defendant resides or the cause of action arose. And, in the majority of cases
exclusively against a governmental unit suit must be brought in the county where the
governmental unit exercises its authority. In substance, the court harmonized the
language of both sections by permitting each section to do exactly what its language
specified without deeming an additional, but unspecified intent into the governmental
venue statute.
POINT II. TO RULE THAT SALT LAKE COUNTY IS THE
EXCLUSIVE VENUE FOR SUITS INVOLVING THE STATE,
WITHOUT EXCEPTION, CREATES AN INHERENT CONFLICT IN
THE VENUE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 63-30-17 AND SECTION 6330d-502.
Section 63-30-17 and now 63-30d-502 both contain language that says actions
against the State may be brought in the county in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake
County; claims against counties may be brought against a county in which the claim arose
or in the defendant county or a contiguous county; but actions against ah other political
subdivisions including cities and towns "shall be" brought in the county in which the
political subdivision is located or in the county in which the claim arose.
In our modern world, the conflict this language creates if the University of Utah
Medical Center's exclusive venue argument is accepted is obvious. Recently, a Nevada
police officer was speeding, collided with four people from Utah and killed them.
Change the location of that accident to Ogden City and the statutory conflict jumps out.
An Ogden City policeman, without justification is speeding and collides with a car
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carrying four Ogden City residents. They are severely injured and life-flighted to the
University of Utah Medical Center. There one of the injured people is given a blood
thinner but the drug isn't properly monitored and the injured person bleeds to death.
Claims for the injuries and death therefore lie against Ogden City for the actions of its
officer and against the University of Utah Medical Center for medical negligence. The
claims should logically and necessarily be tried in one lawsuit.
However, if the University's interpretation of Sections 63-30-17 and 63-30d-502 is
accepted, without exception, either you must force the claim against Ogden City to be
tried in Salt Lake County, which explicitly violates the mandatary statutory language or
you must separate the claims entirely and try two different cases in two different counties
on the same set of operative circumstances which makes no sense in time or money to the
court system or the parties.
The simple and obvious way to avoid this circumstance is to follow the venue
language of Sections 63-30-17 and 63-30d-502 when a governmental unit is the sole
defendant, consistent with the explicit language of those sections, and to follow the venue
language of Section 78-13-7 in multi-defendant situations otherwise you force a "chaotic
multiplicity of litigation" Lawless v. Village of Park Forest South, 438 N.E.2d 1299 (111
App. 1982). Such a ruling harmonizes the explicit language of both statutory provisions.
In the Lawless case, plaintiff brought suit for trespass to land against multiple
cities and city officials. Illinois had a government venue statute which said "Actions must
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be brought against...a...municipal...corporation in the county in which its principal office
is located." Therefore, all the separate defendants moved to force the transfer of the case
to their respective home counties. The Court of Appeals observed: "The result would be
division of this case into multiple cases." The court evaluated the ramifications of the
defendants' arguments and said "acceptance of defendants' interpretation of section 2103(a) would create judicial chaos. In this case, application of defendants' theory would
lead to two separate cases. Situations can easily be postulated in which far more than two
separate cases would have to be created."
The Court rejected defendants' theory saying that in cases involving multiple
governmental units insisting on venue in their own county must yield to having the case
tried in one proceeding regardless of the statutory language.
Interestingly, the Lawless court in its 1982 decision cited to cases in the State of
Florida which had accepted the argument that you must separate the case into multiple
cases and criticized that procedure. Then, in 1983, the Florida Supreme Court in the case
of Board of County Commissioners of Madison County v. Grice, 483 So.2d 392 (1983)
citing Lawless reversed prior decisions and recognized that the home venue privilege for
government entities is not absolute but must yield to a single proceeding when a
governmental body is sued as a joint tortfeasor.
The same reasoning applies with equal force in the case at issue. Accepting the
defendant's position would force this same case to be tried twice in two separate counties
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at a cost of twice the time and twice the expense. Certainly our legislature never intended
such a result.
POINT III. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORT AN
ENTIRE CASE BEING TRIED IN ONE PROCEEDING AND
CONCERNS OF UNDUE CONVENIENCE NO LONGER PREVAIL IN
OUR MODERN SOCIETY.
Defendant contends it is unduly burdensome for it to be sued outside Salt Lake
County. An examination of defendant's website shows it currently operates clinics in
Davis, Utah, Tooele and Salt Lake Counties and conducts outreach programs in schools
and on Indian reservations throughout the State. Clearly, this particular defendant can
reasonably anticipate being sued in any county in the State. On its face the inconvenience
and overly burdensome argument fails.
However, the cases of Lawless v. Village of Park Forest South; Board of County
Commissioners of Madison County v. Grice; Hoffman v. Bos; and Peaceman v. Cades,
416 A.2d 1042 (Pa. Super. 1980) (superceded by statutory amendment) uniformly
recognized that governmental officers are, in this modern age of communication and
travel, no different from any other citizens who may be forced to travel in order to defend
lawsuits in counties other than where they reside. The burden to the University of
defending a claim in Weber County, when it already operates a clinic in Davis County,
and outreach programs statewide, presumptively including Weber County, seems very
slight, indeed if any burden at all.
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Defendant cites only to the case of Abshire v. State of Louisiana, 636 So.2d 627, a
1994 decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals for the State of Louisiana bucking
the above trend which ruled that state officials could only be sued when their ministerial
actions were being called into question in Baton Rouge, the State capitol. That holding
was based upon unique statutory language in Louisiana and was in conflict with other
decisions by other state circuit courts of appeal in Louisiana. It is a distinguishable case.
CONCLUSION
Section 63-30-17 simply does not address multi-defendant cases and there is no
legislative history suggesting that it was intended to do so. Section 78-13-7, however,
does and is, in fact, the only venue statute which does specifically address multidefendant cases. The court should rule that when the state defendant is the sole defendant
and the claim did not arise elsewhere Salt Lake County is the exclusive venue consistent
with Sections 63-30-17 and 63-30d-502. However, when there are multiple defendants,
one of whom is the state, Section 78-13-7 is the controlling provision.
DATED this

^7

day oi/^^d^L^

^

^

MES R. HASENYAGER
Attorney for Plaintiff
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